Chair,

In addition to the statement delivered on behalf of the EU, I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity.

Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

The coming years, the global nuclear weapons stockpile is set to grow for the first time since the end of the Cold War as a result of China’s rapidly increasing nuclear arsenal, inconsistent with its disarmament commitments, while Russia continues to espouse dangerous nuclear rhetoric.

Though these circumstances complicate our shared efforts to attain a world free of nuclear weapons, it should not deter us from taking concrete and credible steps to fulfill our commitments under Article VI. Let me propose five elements that could become part of a results-oriented Action Plan for the Review Conference. 

Chair,

First, we have to continue to discuss and identify effective measures to minimize nuclear risks for as long nuclear weapons do exist, without being prescriptive or exhaustive, or treating them as a substitute for disarmament. 

Second, nuclear-weapon states should clearly and unambiguously reaffirm their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty. They should re-commit to reducing nuclear arsenals and those with the largest arsenals have a special responsibility in this regard. Therefore, it is particularly important that Russia and the US negotiate a follow-up to New START. In the same light, we call on China, the holder of the third largest nuclear-weapons arsenal, to reverse its rapid nuclear expansion and to engage in bilateral and trilateral arms control talks instead.

Third, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament require a baseline of confidence and trust. A lack of transparency increases the risk of misconception, misunderstanding, and eventually escalation. Therefore, we have to make progress on improving transparency and accountability during this Review Cycle. Reporting is a key measure in this regard and we encourage all States Parties, in particular the NWS, to make use of the reporting templates developed by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). 

Fourth, robust and effective verification is crucial to advance to and sustain a nuclear-weapon free world. Over the years, meaningful progress has been made on developing mutual understandings of verification through the GGE and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). These efforts constitute an important and positive step towards the full implementation of Article VI and should be continued.

Fifth, the CTBT and an FMCT are indispensable instruments for achieving and sustaining a nuclear-weapon free world. Therefore, States that have not yet done so should be encouraged to ratify the CTBT and maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing. Moreover, States Parties should formulate steps to commence negotiations on an FMCT in the CD as soon as possible and should call on all states that possess nuclear weapons to instate an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

Chair, 

Despite the challenging geopolitical environment, we look forward to working together with all delegations on practical, results-oriented, and credible steps towards a nuclear-weapon free world.

Thank you Chair.