Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates,
Allow me to begin by thanking UNODA for the opportunity to brief the meeting in my capacity as Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE LAWS), set up in the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (in short: “CCW”).
Let me also express my gratitude to those who have already been heavily involved in our deliberations in Geneva. It is an honour to preside over the discussions of the High Contracting Parties and observers. Let me assure you that I will do my utmost to fulfil the Group’s mandate.
To those of you who are new to the process: I very much welcome your interest in the work of the GGE LAWS. Let me underline that UN Member States who are not a High Contracting Party to the CCW are most welcome to participate in our meetings as an observer, or even better, accede to the CCW and take part in the GGE as a High Contracting Party.
A briefing on ongoing work in the GGE LAWS seems like an excellent starting point for today’s and tomorrow’s broader informal consultations in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 79/62.

In order to place the GGE LAWS in its context, allow me to first briefly introduce the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
The CCW was adopted in 1980 to address the use of certain conventional weapons that are deemed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; or have indiscriminate effects. The Convention is based on the general principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that prohibit the use of weapons with these characteristics.
The CCW consists of a Framework Convention and, so far, of five annexed Protocols. The Convention establishes general provisions for the operation of the CCW and provides a framework for addressing emerging weapons technologies used in armed conflicts, while its Protocols are specifically tailored to address particular types of weapons and their effects.
Almost as important as the substance is the matter of who is a party to the Convention. Currently, the CCW has 128 High Contracting Parties (HCPs) and 4 Signatory States. The HCPs include all major military powers, and this is an important distinction from some other treaties and conventions that regulate the use of specific types of weapons.

GGE LAWS
The GGE LAWS was formally established under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 2016. The Group started its work in 2017, so it has been working for over eight years now. During this time, it held extensive substantive and technical discussions related to addressing emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems.
Much has changed over the years. We started by addressing this topic as a concern of the future. But with the ever more rapid development of weapon systems that can operate with limited, or even no, human intervention, this is now a topic of today. For that reason, the eyes of the international community are upon us. And it is up to the GGE LAWS to achieve concrete results on the issue without delay.
The current mandate was agreed by consensus at the 2023 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties (HCP) of the CCW. It is a carefully crafted formula. Allow me to read it out to you.
The Group is to “further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, taking into account the example of existing Protocols within the Convention, proposals presented by High Contracting Parties
and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group, and bringing in expertise on legal, military, and technological aspects.”
The Group is requested to submit its report to the Seventh Review Conference of the CCW at the end of 2026 but is also asked to complete its work as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 2025. It is the first time the Group has a 3-year mandate. This allows us to concentrate our efforts and focus on producing a tangible outcome. I will now explain how we implement this in practice in a moment.
Furthermore, the SG-report on LAWS which we will discuss later this morning and the Pact for the Future call upon the GGE LAWS to deliver on its mandate as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 2025. Also, the UNSG and the ICRC President have underlined the need for a quick result on various occasions and have even called for agreeing a legally binding instrument – something that goes beyond our present mandate – at the earliest possible moment, preferably before the end of 2025.
With this sense of urgency in mind and with a focus on the desired end-product of the mandate – being “a set of elements for an instrument” we produced what is now called the “Rolling Text”. It is my “best guess” how a set of elements, that could
form the basis for a possible future instrument, could look like. As the wording “rolling text’’ suggests, these elements are intended to be updated and refined every formal meeting, so twice a year.
The general approach of the Group has been to look both at what should be prohibited by a possible future instrument, and at what rather should be regulated. It would go too far to take you through the whole text in detail, but let me outline the main thrust of the document that currently consists of 5 “boxes”:
1) A Working Characterization;
2) Application of IHL;
3) Prohibitions & Regulations;
4) Further Measures;
5) Responsibility & Accountability.
After careful consideration of the thorough and substantive debate during our most recent session in March 2025, my team and I have produced a new “version” of this text, which was circulated earlier among the High Contracting Parties, and which will also be published on the UNODA website. During the remaining three sessions, one in September 2025, and, if necessary, two more in 2026, we will work on fine tuning and finalizing the elements. This will not be an easy task, as some divergences still persist, but with the continued constructive
attitude and the joint efforts of delegations we are in a good position to reach our common goal.
As Chair I can count not only on the support from UNODA’s Implementation Support Unit but also from very able delegates from Australia, Brazil, the Philippines and Switzerland as “Friends of the Chair”. The representatives of these States help me to do outreach and to collect input from delegations and/or capitals both during the formal sessions and during the intersessional period.
Now, in order to show you what the work looks like concretely, I will briefly take you through some of the work we have done so far.

Box 1 Working Characterisation of LAWS
The rolling text first of all contains a working characterisation of LAWS.
Delegations welcomed exchanges on this topic and emphasized the need to have clarity on a common understanding of what the term “LAWS” means to advance the Group’s work. The elements regarding the characterisation triggered a fundamental discussion on a number of controversial points such as the in- or exclusion of existing (defensive) systems, the necessary role of a human operator and the distinction
between lethal and non-lethal weapon systems. Over the different versions of the “rolling text”, the working characterisation has significantly evolved.

Other boxes
The other boxes contain specific prohibitions, regulations and other measures relating to IHL as well as commitments and measures to ensure accountability and responsibility.
A full reflection of the substantive discussions during our last session in March 2025 is published on the UNODA website as “Chair’s Summary”. But allow me to select a few of the concepts that are still under discussion.

Context-appropriate human judgement and control.
What is this exactly, and what level of direct or indirect human involvement ensures compliance with international law? A key question to the Group has always been how humans should exercise control over LAWS to ensure compliance with IHL. Is there a need to always directly control the LAWS or can indirect control be sufficient? Does “taking the device out of a box by an operator before use” also count as human intervention? Probably not, but where exactly do we draw the line and how do we describe that? In these cases, “words really matter”.
It is clear that for most, the necessary level of human judgement and control is very much context dependent. In the new version circulated today, I have therefore proposed “context-appropriate human judgement and control”. This will no doubt spark some discussion among HCP’s. Having said that, everybody does seem to agree that some level of human involvement and/or judgement is needed. No military has an interest in unpredictable and unreliable weapon systems. But it remains a challenge how to ensure this in practice, and to capture this notion in a way that accommodates the concerns of all participants in the GGE LAWS.

Measures needed to comply to IHL
Another question is what measures are necessary for LAWS to be compliant with IHL. In the current text, for instance, there are references to limiting the types of targets, duration, geographical scope, and scale of the operation of LAWS. Examples of such limitations include “ensuring that LAWS incorporate self-destruct, self-deactivation or self-neutralization mechanisms,” “limiting the number of engagements a LAWS can undertake autonomously,” and “ensuring that LAWS’ mission parameters cannot be modified by the system without context- appropriate human judgement and control.” And then there are further possible measures to be considered, for example the need to implement measures to avoid specific types of bias, and the importance of regularly reviewing
weapon systems and possible modifications to ensure compliance to IHL.

Accountability and responsibility
The last part of the text contains elements on accountability and responsibility, with references to the importance of a traceable and responsible chain of human command and control, as well as the need to ensure that “humans at all times remain responsible and accountable in accordance with applicable international law for decisions with regard to LAWS.”
I will give my best efforts to work, in accordance with the mandate of the Group, towards achieving consensus on a substantial text to be presented to the Review Conference.

Role of observers, ICRS, NGO’s and Academia.
Let me emphasize that the fruitful discussions and progress in the GGE LAWS were only possible due to the constructive and tireless efforts of the participants: High Contracting Parties as well as observers. Observers, including observer States, the ICRC, NGOs, International Organizations, and academia, have played a crucial role in the discussions on autonomous weapons over the years. Their participation in the GGE LAWS meetings continues to provide valuable expertise and diverse perspectives. I encourage all those that have not yet joined the discussions to do so and let their voices be heard.

Other relevant processes
I would like to emphasize that also initiatives outside the GGE LAWS, including the informal consultations we are having here now in New York, but also numerous other initiatives, regional and international conferences, underline the growing importance of the topic of autonomous weapon systems. These initiatives also broaden the scope of the international discussion on autonomous weapon systems by putting topics on the agenda that are not discussed, or not discussed in great detail, by the GGE LAWS. The reason being that it has a narrowly defined mandate, because of a high sense of urgency and also taking into account the limited number of meeting days per year.

Concluding
Let me conclude by stating that progressing towards meaningful and effective international agreements on strategically and operationally important weapon systems, is never an easy job. As I said earlier, “words matter” and reaching consensus takes time. Not because we are involved in a word game of finding synonyms and translations, but because we are grappling with the dynamics between military necessity, humanitarian considerations and the international legal order in times of geopolitical tensions.
I think I can safely say that many States, if not all, are deeply interested in acquiring some of the capabilities that AI and LAWS promise. At the same time, the reason we have this discussion in the framework of the CCW is that the High Contracting Parties want to do so in a responsible manner, battling risks of AI and autonomy in weapon systems that no State wants to become reality.
In doing so responsibly, we should put all our effort into making sure IHL is applied and respected. For this reason, the process might not always be as swift as we would like to see, but I remain convinced that it is better to take some extra time and achieve a future-proof consensus with everybody on board, than ending up with a relatively quick fix that has only limited support among the military significant states.
Chair,
Let me reassure you once more that I am well aware that the context of the GGE is challenging. There are no quick fixes to complex problems. However, in the GGE LAWS we are witnessing a unique willingness to make progress and to engage constructively, something we should cherish also taking into account the prevailing security environment.
Therefore, I call upon all of you to keep supporting the process and to feed us with your insights, expertise, and ideas to
bridge divergences. The Group can only benefit from your expertise and views.
I am looking forward to welcome you in Geneva at the September session of the GGE LAWS.
I thank you for your attention and stand ready to take questions.